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With the somewhat belated acceptance 
by Canada in 1969 of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention relating to the status of 
refugees, and legislative confirmation 
first in an amendment to the Immigra- 
tion Appeal Board Act during the 
1973-74 session of Parliament and sub- 
sequently in the new lmmigration Act, 
1976, the potential for Canadian courts, 
tribunals and lawyers to resort to inter- 
national law for direction and guidance 
on refugee law seemed promising. But 
as noted by Wydrzynski in his recent 
text on Canadian immigration law and 
procedure, this development has not 
occurred for a variety of reasons. One 
of the inhibiting factors undoubtedly 
has been the lack of an authoritative 
common law reference work. Grahl- 
Madsen's classic volumes have been re- 
ferred to occasionally by Canadian 
courts, but its civil law style may have 
contributed to the relative paucity of 
reliance on it in Canadian legal forums. 
In this context, the arrival on the com- 
mon law scene of Goodwin-Gill's ex- 
amination of the refugee in internation- 
al law may be timely and significant. 
The author is introduced on the jacket 
as a legal adviser at the Office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). He explains in his acknowl- 
edgements that some of the book's ori- 
gins lie in his research for the D.Phil. 
degree at Oxford. Australia provided 
the setting for its writing, although in- 
put from New Zealand sources is also 
recognized. Thus the work under re- 
view has quite strong common law ties 
from the Commonwealth, which are 
reflected in its text and footnotes. 
Part One of the work commences with 
a review of events leading up to the 
definition of the term refugee in the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Pro- 
tocol, then considers some regional and 
municipal developments. A chapter 
analyzing the Convention definition 
and its application in the determination 
of refugee status follows. This should 
be of considerable interest and benefit 
to lawyers practising before Canadian 
courts. For example, there is an illumi- 
nating discussion on the difficult prob- 
lem of whether claimants who fear 
prosecution and punishment for con- 
scientious objection to military service 
fall within the Convention definition. 
or whether they are merely in breach of 
laws of general application and there- 
fore do not quality as Convention refu- 
gees. Canadian case law is divided and 
somewhat confusing on this issue. Re- 
course to the experience of other legal 
jurisdictions might prove helpful in re- 
solving our difficulties on the question. 
Loss and denial of refugee status and 
benefits are addressed in the next chap- 
ter. Again, examination of this topic is 
of interest to the Canadian scene. The 
lmmigration Act, 1976 does not ensure 
that the Convention refugee, once so 
found, will have a right to remain in 
Canada. Curiously, he or she must be 
"lawfully in Canada" in order to have 
the right to remain. Of course, the 
refugee has no status in Canadian law 
., 
on arrival, or if a visitor, must have 
lost that status in order to initiate a 
formal refugee claim toward the end of 
the inquiry proceeding. Attempts in 
the Boun-Leau and Dmitrovic cases in 
the Federal Court of Appeal to chal- 
lenge the offending provision of the 
Immigration Act, 1976 failed, although 
the particular facts in these two cases 
may have dictated a result not incon- 
sistent with international law. Never- 
theless, this quirk in our present immi- 
gration legislation would seem gener- 
ally to be contrary to our international 
obligations. Goodwin-Gill discusses 
the situations in which voluntary acts 
of the individual or a change in circum- 
stances will lead to a loss and denial of 
refugee status and its benefits, setting 
forth three particular types of un- 
deserving cases. His discussion of these 
issues should be helpful in arguing 
against extensions of the Boun-Leau 
and Dmitrovic cases. 
For the Canadian reader, the next two 
parts of the book may be of less imme- 
diate interest. Nevertheless, they pro- 
vide a focus on the international legal 
situation of refugees. Part Two covers 
asylum. It commences with an exami- 
nation of the principle of non-refoule- 
ment, that is, "that no refugee should 
be returned to any country where he or 
she is likely to face persecution or 
danger to life or freedom". In Goodwin- 
Gill's view, the evidence supports a 
conclusion that the non-refoulement 
principle forms part of general inter- 
national law. Of particular concern is 
the admission and non-rejection of a 
refugee claimant at the frontier of a 
state. On its face, the Immigration Act, 
1976 accommodates the principle of 
non-refoulement. One might question, 
however, whether the Canadian policy 
of instructing its visa officers in other 
countries not to issue visas to those 
who might make a refugee claim on 
arrival in Canada, meets with the spirit 
and intendment of the principal of non- 
refoulement. Goodwin-Gill also ex- 
amines non-refoulement in the particu- 
lar situations of extradition, expulsion 
and illegal entry, recognizing that cer- 
tain situations will be exceptional and 
not amount to refoulement. 
There follows a chapter on asylum 
which is essentially an historical review 
of its origins and development in inter- 
national instruments and acts, leading 
up to the failure of the 1977 U.N. Con- 
ference to resolve the essential issues. 
In the penultimate section of this chap- 
ter, Goodwin-Gill discusses the in- 
tractable problems created by recent 
large-scale movement of refugees. 
Essentially the 1951 Convention con- 
cerned itself with the individual refugee 
seeking asylum. Traditional approach- 
es to asylum, although still relevant, 
have proved to be insufficient in recent 
years to cope with politicaland human- 
itarian problems of refugees on a mas- 
sive scale. That states in proximity to 
the source of refugees will now provide 
temporary asylum, but not a lasting 
solution, is hardly surprising. Although 
the principle of non-refoulement may 
be observed, no easy resolution of the 
extremely difficult problems created by 
